Hacked emails show how Jeffrey Epstein and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak tried to engineer a Russian-led solution to remove Bashar al-Assad.
Jeffrey Epstein facilitated efforts to open a backchannel between Israel and the Kremlin during the Syrian civil war, according to leaked emails from former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
The trove of emails, exchanged at the height of the Syrian civil war between 2013 and 2016, reveals Epstein’s successful efforts to secure a private meeting between Barak and Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss a Russian-brokered end to the conflict, including winning Russian support for a negotiated removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Epstein was an invaluable resource for Israel’s former prime minister, who also served as head of intelligence and defense minister throughout his career, sharing whispers from within Russian elite circles and intel on Putin’s interlocutors in Europe and the U.S—and even advising him on how to engage with the Mossad. Barak, fresh out of his role as Israeli defense minister, built a deep portfolio of investments and business relationships around the world with Epstein’s help.
On February 21, 2014, Epstein wrote to Barak, “With civil unrest exploding in Ukraine, Syria, Somalia [sic], Libya, and the desperation of those in power, isn’t this perfect for you.” Barak replied: “You’re right in a way. But not simple to transform it into a cash flow. A subject for Saturday.”
These efforts also provided cover for covert diplomacy on behalf of the Israeli government. Together, Barak and Epstein sought to pressure the Obama administration to either intervene directly in the Syrian war or make concessions to the Kremlin in exchange for Assad’s graceful exit. In their exchanges, Epstein expressed his frustration at the Obama administration’s failures to contain Tehran, as the two men searched for opportunities to promote U.S. strikes on Iran.
Despite securing a sit-down with Putin in the summer of 2013, they did not succeed in convincing Russia to support Assad’s ouster, but their negotiations set the stage for U.S.-Russia cooperation on the disarmament of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal a few months later.
Michael Oren, former Israeli ambassador to the U.S., wrote in his memoir that Israel’s diplomatic leadership was told to “avoid being perceived as a player” in Syria. Clandestine actors sought to shape agendas in Moscow and Washington, while Israeli officials denied involvement and used the media to legitimize “red lines” for air strikes inside Syria.
After their failed attempt to remove Assad, Barak and Epstein sought to leverage the Russian channel again in 2015, as Barak pushed for U.S. strikes on Iran and rejected Obama’s nuclear deal framework. Barak failed to convince the Obama administration to change course. The plot, nevertheless, illustrated Epstein’s knack for steering the superpowers toward Israel’s interests by leveraging a social network that intersected the Israeli, American, and Russian intelligence communities.
The leaked emails come from the same archive previously reported by Drop Site—materials released by the hackers known as Handala and disseminated by Distributed Denial of Secrets. The emails include extensive, previously unpublished documents and photographs from Barak’s inner circle, including non-public information verified as accurate by Drop Site. Many documents from the Handala hack were independently validated by records released by the U.S. House Oversight Committee this month.
Our ongoing series reveals how Epstein used elite networks and quasi-official institutions to promote Israeli security interests and enrich his circle of friends and companions. This story follows the same pattern, with the highest of stakes: a chaotic war on Israel’s ever-expanding border, and the balance of power between the United States and Russia.
Barak did not respond to a request for comment. Epstein died in jail in New York during the first Trump administration. The news outlet The (b)(7)(D) previously reported on some of the correspondence.
“The Kremlin Holds the Keys”
In the early hours of May 9, 2013, former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak emailed his close friend Jeffrey Epstein with an urgent message. “R U awake? If yes, pl call,” Barak wrote Epstein, at 1 a.m. in New York. Shortly after they spoke, Barak emailed again to ask Epstein to keep their conversation private: “Jeff, please don’t share the info with any of our friends.”
Epstein replied: “Of course not. I think you should let Putin know you will be in Moscow. See if he wants private time.”
Barak and Epstein built a backchannel to Putin in hopes of winning Russia’s support to remove Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from power, according to leaked emails from Barak’s inbox. Before approaching Putin, Barak and Epstein sought to use one of the major American newspapers to frame Israel’s narrative about the Syrian war, and telegraph a framework for peace talks led by the United States and Russia.
That spring, the Syrian civil war entered its third year. A popular uprising against the Assad regime had rapidly devolved into a brutal sectarian conflict fueled by foreign powers. The flow of Russian and Iranian weapons inside Syria and the threat of their diversion to Israel’s enemies were among Israel’s top security priorities.
Since the early days of the war, Israeli security leaders believed Assad’s downfall was imminent. Barak, then serving as Israel’s Defense Minister, told the Washington Post in December 2011 that Assad’s fall was “inevitable,” and a matter of “weeks…not a matter of months or years.”
More than a year later, Barak’s prediction had still not come true. With Russia and Iran’s support, Assad stubbornly clung to power. Israeli officials, recognizing the need to engage Russia, visited Moscow in January 2013 to discuss concerns about Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile falling into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon or Sunni militants linked to al-Qaeda.
Meanwhile, Israel escalated its operations within Syria’s borders. In late January, the Israeli air force conducted an airstrike on Damascus intended to halt the transfer of surface-to-air missiles to Hezbollah. Barak postured about the strikes at a security conference the following month: “When we say something, we mean it.” He reiterated his assertion that Assad’s fall “is coming imminently,” and when it happens, “this will be a major blow to the Iranians and Hezbollah.”
But Assad still refused to bend, and Hezbollah’s strategic gains on Israel’s borders increased the pressure to remove Iran’s man in Damascus. Rapprochement with the Kremlin offered a solution.
Barak stepped down from his post in March 2013 after the failure of his new political party to contest the Knesset elections. His retirement from formal office, he said, meant that he now would have time to “study, write, live and enjoy.” Instead, he immediately began working with Epstein to conduct covert diplomatic work in support of Israeli security interests abroad.
The key to Barak’s backchannel diplomacy with Russia was his relationship with Viktor Vekselberg, a Russian-Israeli oligarch and owner of the multinational conglomerate Renova Group. Barak offered his services as a strategic consultant to Renova, a position that would generate a lucrative salary for himself and further his ambitions in the global mining and energy sectors, while enhancing his access to powerful figures in the Russian elite.
Barak kept Epstein abreast of every update on his courtship with Vekselberg. As Barak progressed toward a formal agreement with Renova, Epstein counseled Barak on contract negotiations, writing on April 27, “I think you should propose all up front. No need for a written agreement. until later.”
Beneath the surface of mundane contract details, Epstein and Barak worked on a covert plan with the support of Israeli intelligence—regime change in Damascus.
The Israeli military strategist, often described as “emotionally handicapped,” relied on Epstein to help him craft his messaging when dealing with other political officials and business elites. Epstein, for instance, asked Barak to wait until they could speak privately before Barak notified intelligence leaders of a deal with Vekselberg: “Do not go to number 1 too quickly, I understand more now, so we should speak.” The euphemism “number 1” is a moniker used to refer to the head of the Mossad, dating back to Barak’s days as director of Israeli military intelligence, when the Mossad director’s identity was kept secret.
As the Renova contract was being finalized—a $1 million advance and a $1 million quarterly retainer—Barak planned a trip to Moscow on May 12 to meet with Vekselberg.
A few hours after Barak informed Epstein of his Moscow plans, Epstein shared some intelligence about one of Putin’s interlocutors, the head of the Council of Europe: “on may 20 [thorbjorn] jagland is going to see putin in sochi, jagland asked that I make myself availble to meet with him sometine in june, to explain how russia can structure deals in order to encourage western investment, I never met him, wanted you to know.” Barak, who was working closely with Epstein to cut deals in the Eurasian energy sector, wrote back: “i know Jagland for long time. Probably we have to talk about it.”
Epstein responded with a short list of past and present American national security leaders who, his response implied, could also be useful in Russia talks. He wrote, “Ok, Panetta??, Alexander, Clarke?”—likely referring to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, NSA Director Keith Alexander, and Cybersecurity Czar Richard Clarke.
In the meantime, Epstein and Barak crafted an op-ed for Barak to publish that could shape the narrative for a Russian-led transition in Syria that secured Israel’s interests.
On May 19, Barak sent Epstein a draft titled “The Kremlin Holds the Keys,” which argued that Assad’s regime had permanently lost its legitimacy, and Russia should take leadership to negotiate a swift end to the war, or see “years of bloody massacres…in a ‘no man’s land’ Syria.” A “post-Assad” Syria, wrote Barak, was a foregone conclusion; it was now up to Russia to decide whether or not to “convince Assad to leave,” or prolong the war.
Barak’s editorial proposed that the U.S. and its allies should accept a “price” for a Russia-led solution to the war. He acknowledged that removing Assad from power should not compromise Russia’s “interests and perspectives” in Syria—namely, Russia’s deep ties within the Syrian security apparatus, and its access to naval bases at Tartus and Latakia. He framed the chemical weapons threat as a decisive issue requiring initiative by the Russians, who knew “the generals of the chemical weapons units on a first-name basis.”
The backdrop of Barak’s editorial was Russia’s looming delivery of advanced weapons systems to Syria, including anti-ship missiles and advanced air defenses, which threatened to further entrench Israel’s enemies. In the weeks prior, Israel began escalating its operations inside Syria, conducting more air strikes on Damascus to block Iranian missiles bound for Hezbollah; Russia responded by sending its warships into the Mediterranean.
Barak felt enormous urgency to secure a face-to-face meeting with Putin as soon as possible, before the conflict escalated further. Besides Epstein, he also requested comments from Ron Dermer, a close confidante to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was preparing to become Israel’s next ambassador to the U.S. Barak wrote to Dermer, “I don’t care how you’ve corrected it. Yours will always be better in clarity and conciseness than mine. Try earlier. I don’t want events to overwhelm us.” Dermer swiftly returned a refined copy with more fluent English.
As was typical of Epstein’s style, he sent back a rough cut riddled with spelling and grammatical errors. Unlike Dermer’s narrower cut, Epstein significantly revised Barak’s piece and added a new title: “Wait Until It’s Too Late.” Epstein’s draft was more forceful and polemical, scolding the U.S. for failing to act, and adding an unambiguous statement of Israel’s national interest that was absent in Barak’s draft: “Israel cannot simply wait until it’s too late.”
Epstein did indeed wait until it was too late to send his edits; Barak wrote back: “Unfortunately, we came to a deadline and had to send somewhat less brilliant text. I hope one of the big three will buy it.”
The New York Times rejected Barak’s editorial. The Times’s international opinion editor wrote: “We are potentially interested but we feel that the key part of the piece is left vague. Proposing a Russian-mediated solution is only an appealing op-ed for us if the mechanics are spelled out. Barak is a military man and an experienced negotiator, so I have no doubt he has something specific in mind…What does he think the price will be? What is the Russian incentive to budge now?”
Epstein had conveyed a similar criticism of Barak’s draft: “I thought the article should have more of a headline, so that you are clearly associated with a [position].” After the rejection from the NYT, Barak wrote Epstein back: “U R Right.”
Epstein then expanded on his own aggressive view, arguing that the U.S. was waiting too long to intervene when it came to Palestinians and Iran: “I really like the Wait until it’s too Late, to be your critique of the community’s foreign policy. Years ago, things moved slowly; Stalin took weeks to defend. months of preparation. strategies, etc., today these things force decisions, for good and for bad .. The U. S wait policy, the Palestinian wait policy, iran wait policy,”.
Barak decided not to address the specific questions posed by the NYT editor. He wrote to his spokesman on May 21: “Tell them they can get a full description of answers to all their questions in a different piece…not now because it will empty the main message.” The Times rejection was followed by rejections from the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. The op-ed was eventually published, without Epstein’s changes, in The Telegraph on May 30, 2013.
